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I.

COUNSEL MAY APPROPRIATELY REPRESENT ALL APPELLANTS.

Interstate objects to attorneys Ronald C. Barker and Larry
L. Whyte

as counsel

for the five appellants.

It should be

noted that Larry L. Whyte is no longer associated with this law
office as he has recently accepted an offer from another firm.
Mr. Whyte has been replaced by David C. Cundick.
Interstate's sole argument against counsel representing all
appellants is that the Ingersolls are named on the caption of
this case as proposed plaintiffs in intervention and appellants
while Patterson is named as a proposed defendant in intervention
and appellant.

Interstate maintains that this is a violation of

the Rule 1.7(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Interstate

argues that because of the caption of this casef Patterson and
the

Ingersolls

are

opposing

parties.

This

is not correct,

Patterson and the Ingersolls1 positions are not inconsistent.
Additionallyf this is the identical argument that Interstate made
in its' Motion for Summary Disposition which was filed before
this Court on or about February 3, 1987.
motion on or about March 4, 1987.

The Court denied that

It is apparent, thereforef

that this Court has already heard and decided against Interstate
on this repeated argument.
There are no conflicts of interest between Patterson and the
Ingersolls.

To the contrary,

Patterson wishes that Ingersolls1

appeal be granted so that Ingersolls can intervene as co-defendant with Patterson.

Additionally, it is important to note that
- 1 -

Patterson and the Ingersolls1 interest in the property subject to
this dispute is an undivided interest.

It is obvious that there

is no ethical problem of counsels' representation in this matter.
II.
1.

The

concerning

THIS COURT HAS PROPER JURISDICTION.
Court

has already

jurisdiction.

Interstate1s

heard

Respondent

Interstate

argument

argues

that

Patterson and the Ingersolls failed to file a notice of appeal as
required within thirty (30) days after entry of a final order by
the lower court.

This is the same argument that Interstate made

in its1 Motion for Summary Disposition which was filed before this
Court on or about February 3if 1987. The Court denied that motion
on or about March
argument moot.

4, 1987, which should make this

repeated

Patterson and the Ingersolls will address the

merits of this argument on the chance that the Court may for some
unknown reason wish to reconsider the issue.
2.

Appellants' Motion to Correct Order was not defective.

Interstate's

main

Michael

Murphy's

R.

Patterson

and

contention

stems

Memorandum

Ingersolls'

Motion

from

Opinion
to

the
and

Correct

Honorable
Order

Judge
denying

Order.

(see

Memorandum Opinion and Order attached hereto as exhibit "a", page
3, 1[2.) The contention is that when Patterson and the Ingersolls
brought a timely Motion to Correct Order under URCP 59 after the
lower

court

entered

judgment

against

them,

the

motion

was

defective as a procedural matter/ that because the motion was
allegedly defective, it allegedly failed to toll the thirty (30)
- 2 -

day limitation period for bringing an appeal after judgment has
been entered.

Patterson and Ingersoll believe that the Motion

was proper for the following reasons:
3.

A summary judgment is a trial.

Interstate complains

that a motion to correct under URCP 59 is defective since there
has not been a trial.

Such is not the case.

Black's Law

Dictionaryy fifth ed. p. 1348f defines trial as;

"a judicial

examination

parties

and

determination

of

issues

between

to

action, whether they be issues of law or of fact." (citations
ommitted.)

Clearly the lower court made a judicial determination

of issues of law when it entered judgment granting Interstate's
Motion

for

Summary

Judgment.

If

it failed

to make such a

determination, the court by definition would have acted in an
arbitrary

and

capricious

manner

in

rendering

its1

decision.

Interstate, in its1 brief, offers no authority to the contrary.
In any event, summary judgment is a trial and a motion to correct
is proper under URCP 59.
4.

Federal courts allow a FRCP 59 motion where there has

not been a formal trial.

The Tenth Circut Court of Appeals, in

Vreeken v. Davis, 718 F.2d

343

(10th Cir., 1983), allowed an

appeal under FRCP 59 where the district court ruled against the
appellant on a motion for summary judgment.
lants1 Brief

As noted in Appel-

(see Appellants1 brief, page 17, 1[ 2), the Tenth

Circuit Court of Appeals is not alone in holding that FRCP 59 is
proper procedure for a party seeking to vacate summary judgment
- 3 -

even though there has not been a formal trial with witnesses.
5.

The

holding

in Vreeken

is sound

law.

questions the soundness of the Vreeken decision.

Interstate

In Vreeken, the

court succintly described the procedural facts as follows:
In the instant case, the district court stated in open
court that it would grant the defendants1 motion for
summary judgment; it then entered the summary judgment order
on March 30f 1982.
In the interim, on March 23, the
plaintiffs filed a pleading styled "Motion for Leave to File a
Second Amended Complaint," which the court denied on May 28,
1982.
On June 25, 1982, the plaintiffs filed a notice of
appeal.
Thus, unless the plaintiffs1 motion of March 23
tolled the running of the time for filing a notice of appeal
on the summary judgment order, the plaintiffs1 notice of
appeal was untimely except as to the denial of the motion to
file an amended complaint. Id. at page 345.
The Tenth Circuit then stated that even though plaintifffs
Motion for leave to File a Second Amended Complaint was made
pursuant to FRCP 60(b), the court would treat it as a FRCP 59(e)
motion, Id. at page 345.
Interstate argues that, "In Vreeken, the court ignored the
plain meaning of a motion and held that a motion to file an
amended complaint was somehow intended to be a motion to alter of
amend the judgment."

(See Interstate's brief, page 3 112). What

Interstate fails to point out is that the court went on to note
that even though the motion was styled as a motion for leave to
file an amended complaint, the motion specifically requested in
the motion itself that the district court treat the motion as one
made pursuant to FRCP 59, Id. at page 345.

The Tenth Circuit,

therefore, did not act as irrational as Interstate would lead
this Court to believe.

To the contrary, the Tenth Circuit simply
_

4

.

gave a liberal view to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
allowed the plaintiffs1 motion in the district court to toll the
running of the time for filing a notice of appeal on the summary
judgment order.
While the merits of the Vreeken decision are based upon the
facts in that case, it is clear that the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals has adopted the rule that a FRCP 59 motion tolls the time
for taking an appeal, whether the motion follows a trial with
live witnesses or a summary judgment.
There is no sound legal reason why the trial court should be
permited to re-examine and to possibly correct its1 decision on a
URCP 59 motion following a trial with live witnesses, but should
not be permitted to do so following a summary judgment trial. To
permit the court to re-examine and, if appropriate, to correct
its summary

judgment decision may avoid many unnecessary and

costly appeals.
6.

The holding in Durkin should not apply to the facts of

this case.

Interstate argues that Durkin v. Taylor, 444 F. Supp.

879 (E.D. Va. 1977), which did not authorize a party who had lost
a motion for summary judgment to file a motion to alter judment
under FRCP 59(e), is applicable to the facts of this case.

In

Durkin, however, the appellant was not barred from bringing his
appeal by the courtfs harsh application of rule 59.

In the

present case, Patterson and the Ingersolls brought their Motion
to Correct Order in good faith and with persuasive legal support
- 5 -

that the Motion complied with proper procedure. To allow a narrow
and harsh application of rule 59 such as is argued by Interstate
would be inequitable, especially when one considers Patterson and
Ingersolls1

previous

argument

that

URCP

59

is more

broadly

drafted that FRCP 59 (see appellant's brief, page 16f 1(1).
7.

Interstate1s

irrelevant

to

cases

Interstate

argues

argument

in

that

the

concerning

Third

neither

rule

Judicial

Patterson

2.9(b)

District

nor

the

is

Court.

Ingersolls

filed any objection to Interstatefs proposed order even though
Interstate complied with the requirements of Rule 2.9(b) of the
Rules of Practice in the District Courts and Circuit Courts of
the

State

Interstate

of

Utah

reasons

Interstatefs

(see
that

because

brief,

Patterson

and

page
the

6,

1f 1 ) .

Ingersolls

failed to object to its1 proposed order as required by Rule 2.9,
they cannot attack the substance of the proposed order on appeal.
Interstate fails to recognize Rule 5 of the Local Rules of the
Third Judicial District Court.

Rule 5 specifically states that:

Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice in the District Courts and
of the State of Utah shall not apply in the Third Judicial
District Court.
Rule 5 further states:
(b) Copies of the proposed order . . . shall be served on
opposing counsel before being presented to the court for
signature unless approved as to form by opposing counsel,
or the court otherwise orders. (emphasis added.)
Rule

5

suggests

that

any

objection

Ingersolls made to Interstate's proposed

order

only to the form of such proposed order.
- 6 -

Patterson

or

the

is appropriate

Patterson and the

Ingersolls1 objection to the proposed order in the lower court
was to the content of the proposed order and as such an objection
under Rule 5 would not have been correct as a procedural matter.
III.

RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED TO THIS CASE.
1.

There is no conclusive evidence showing that the lower

court granted summary judgment for reasons of collateral estoppel
and res judicata.

Interstate contends as an undisputed fact that

the lower court granted summary judgment based on the doctrine of
res judicata and/or collateral estoppel (see, respondent's brief,
page 11, 1f 1 ) . There is, however, no evidence to support such an
allegation, nor can Interstate show such evidence.

The clear

facts of the case show that no reason was ever stated as to why
the motion for summary judgment was granted.
2.

Interstate1s

collateral

estoppel

appropriate to the facts of this case.
West

Jordan,

7

Utah

2d

391,393,

explained the applicability

argument

is

not

This Court, In Re Town of

326

P.2d

105,107

(1958),

of collateral estoppel, stating:

That doctrine only applies where a question of fact essential
to and determinative of the judgment is actually litigated and
determined by a valid or final judgment which is conclusive as
between the parties to a subsequent action on a different
cause of action.
To apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel Interstate must
show

that

an

issue present

in the case

at bar was already

litigated between the parties in a previous action.

Interstate

feebly argues that the issues of the present case were already
- 7 -

litigated in Salt Lake City Corporation v. Mountain Fuel Supply
Company, Third District Court for Salt Lake County, Civil No.
A copy of Ingersolls1 Amended Complaint, which sets

C78-7764.

forth the issues of the case, is attached hereto as "exhibit b n .
In that case the issues involved for litigation included:
1. Whether the Ingersolls were entitled to a declaratory
judgment with respect to the validity and effect of certain
Salt Lake City Ordinances;
2. Whether the Ingersolls could receive an injunction against
Mountain Fuel Supply Co* enjoining it from interferring with
the same property of this present case as a use by the public
as a public thoroughfare; and,
3.
Whether the Ingersolls were entitled to damages in
connection with Mountain Fuel Supply Co. prohibiting the
public from using the property as a thoroughfare.
The

issues

validity

of

in the Salt Lake City case all involved

certain

Salt

Lake

Ordinances

and

whether

the
such

ordinances were effective to maintain the property as a public
road.

Such issues are significantly different from the issues of

the present case which involve the rights of parties to ownership
of the same property now that it has been determined that Salt
Lake City no longer has use of the property as a public road.
3.
the

Interstate1s res judicata argument is not appropriate to

facts

of

this

case.

The

doctrine

of

res

adequately explained in 46 Am.Jur. Judgments, §394.

judicata

is

It provides:

. . . the doctrine of res judicata is that an existing final
judgment rendered upon the merits, without fraud or collusion,
by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive of causes
of action and of facts or issues thereby litigated, as to the
parties and their privies, in all other actions in the same or
any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction.
- 8 -

In order to find that res judicata is applicable to the
facts of this case, Interstate must show that this cause of
action has previously been litigated in the Salt Lake City case.
This is not possible since the cause of action in the previous
case was to decide the validity of Salt Lake City Ordinances 172,
173 and 200.

The Ingersolls were unsuccessful in arguing that

the ordinances were valid.
decided

Ownership of the property was not

in that case and therefore there is no res judicata

argument available for Interstate is this present action.
It is interesting that Interstate argues in its1 brief that,
"since the ownership of the vacated property was the central
issue in the Salt Lake City Case, this Court should apply the
doctrine

of

res

judicata

to

bar

Ingersolls1

the

proposed

complaint in intervention in this case (see, Interstates'• brief,
pages 46 and 47).

If ownership of the vacated property was

indeed the central issue in the Salt Lake City Case, it would
appear that Interstate would be barred

in the present action

against Patterson for those same principles of res judicata.

It

is obvious that ownership was not the central issue of the Salt
Lake City Case and that the principles of res judicata are not
applicable to the facts of the present case.
IV.

THE INGERSOLLS1 DID NOT MAKE BARE ALLEGATIONS IN ARGUING
AGAINST INTERSTATEfS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Interstate

erroneously

argues

that

Patterson

and

the

Ingersolls should not be allowed to claim on appeal that there is
- 9 -

a disputed
submitted

issue of fact because Patterson and the Ingersolls
no

affidavits

or

memorandum

in

opposition

to

Interstate1 Motion for Summary Judgment (see, Interstate's brief,
page 30f K 2 ) .
language

of

Interstate, however, fails to understand the

URCP

56

(c)•

Speaking

directly

to

procedure

involving summary judgmentr the rule provides:
. . . The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings • • . on filef together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. . . . (emphasis added).
The Ingersolls attached exhibits to their Proposed Complaint
in Intervention

(a copy of which is attached hereto as exhibit

"c"), meaning that the Ingersolls did not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of their pleadings but that the exhibits
attached to their Proposed Complaint in Intervention, which was
on

file

denials.

with

the

court, supported

their

allegations

and/or

Therefore, Patterson and the Ingersolls are free to

argue the existence of a material fact on appeal.
V,
1.

INTERSTATE MISAPPLIES UCA 57-1-20

OCA 57-1-20 conveys title only as security.

UCA 57-1-20

states:
Transfers in trust of real property may be made to secure the
performance of an obligation of the trustor . « . to a beneeficiary. All right, title, interest and claim in and to the
trust property acquired by the trustor, or his successors in
interest, subsequent to the execution of the trust deed shall
inure to the trustee as security for the obligation or obligations for which the trust property is conveyed in like manner
as if acquired before execution of the trust deed. (emphasis
added.)
- 10 -

Interstate, in its1 brief, goes to great extents to show
that title passes to the trustee when a trust deed is created
(seef

Interstate's

brief, pages

34-41).

Patterson

and

the

Ingersolls strongly assert that in accordance with UCA 57-1-20,
title inured to the trustee only for purposes of security and
nothing else.
2.

Ownership of the property remained with the Ingersolls

and Lemel after the trust deed was executed.

As established in

Appellants1 brief (see, Appellants1 brief pages 10-11) and agreed
to in Respondent

Interstatefs brief

(see, Interstate's brief,

page 41, 11 1 ) , Utah is a lien state with respect to mortgages,
meaning that ownership remains with the mortgagor.

Patterson and

the Ingersolls contend that Utah Law applies this same theory of
mortgages to trust deeds.
P.2d 118

In Bybee v, Stuart, 112 Utah 462, 189

(1948), the Utah Supreme Court held that Utah was a

lien state in a case involving a mortgage.

The court agreed with

this lien theory even in the face of Sec. 78-1-13, U.C.A. 1943
which the court quoted:
. . . such mortgage when executed as required by law shall
have the effect of a conveyance of the land therein described, together with all the rights, privileges, and appurtenances thereunto belonging, to the mortgagee, his
heirs, assigns and legal representatives, as security for
the payment of the indentedness. . . .(emphasis in original. )
It is interesting to compare the language of the above-quoted
statute with that of UCA 57-1-20

(quoted supra., p 10).

The

language is quite similar in that both the conveyance of the
- 11 -

interest is given as security.
It is readily apparent that the court reasoned that a lien
theory is preferable to a title theory because the former theory
does not enable the owner of the mortgage to recover possession
of the real property without a foreclosure sale.
Applying this theory to the present case, it would appear
that if a title theory were applied to a trust deed a situation
would arise that the court in the Bybee case, supra, was trying
to avoid. That situation being that if ownership was passed to
the trustee when the trust deed was created, the trustee could
take the position of an owner and obtain possession of the land
without following the proper procedure for forclosure on the deed
of trust.
Futher, to assert that ownership of the property passed to
the trustee upon execution of the deed of trust would mean that
when Salt Lake City vacated

the street to the owners of the

adjoining property, the trustee received such ownership of the
vacated property.

And, if the trustors paid off: the obligation

owed

of trust, the trustee would

on the deed

still own the

vacated property and as such, would receive a windfall through
acting as trustee.

Such a scenario is absurd and could not be

contemplated by any rational reasoning.
Because the trustee received only a security interest in the
property of the trust deed, Patterson and the Ingersolls had
ownership of the vacated street property.
- 12 -

The facts of the case

plainly

show that

neither

Patterson

nor

the

Ingersolls

ever

deeded this property to anyone else and therefore/ they are still
the owners of the property.
VI. CONCLUSION
1.

Patterson and the Ingersolls have shown that they are

entilted to prevail on their appeal.

URCP 56 mandates that in

order for summary judgment to have been properly entered against
Patterson and the Ingersolls, there must have been no genuine
issue of fact and Interstate was entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.

Appellants Patterson and the Ingersolls have established

a genuine issue of fact and further, that they are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
2.

On review,

this Court should consider all the facts in

the light most favorable to Patterson and the Ingersolls.

The

Utah Supreme Court has held that on review, a party against whom
summary judgment has been granted is entitled to the benefit of
having the court consider all of the facts presented, and every
inference fairly arising therefrom, in the light most favorable
to him.

See, Morris v. Farnsworth Hotel, 123 Utah 289, 259 P.2d

297 (1953).

When this Court uses the above stated standard in

considering the present appeal, it is apparent that the holding
of the trial court must be overruled.

- 13 -

Dated this ^

-fur\

day of January, 1988.

Ronald C.
David C. Cundick,
Attorneys for Appellants
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ADDENDUM
A. EXHIBITS

Memorandum Opinions and Order

Exhibit "a"

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
INTERSTATE LAND CORPORATION,
a Utah corporation,
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
Plaintiff,
ORDER
vs.
R. D. PATTERSON

CIVIL NO. C 85-790

Defendant.
This

matter

came

before

the

court

on

the

motions

of

defendant R. D. Patterson and proposed Intervenors to correct
previous orders.
59(a)(6)

and

The motions are expressly premised on Rules

(7), 59(d),

59(e),

60(b),

U.R.C.P.,

"or

other

applicable rules" and are directed at the following orders:
1.

Order Denying Motion to Intervene Filed by Melvin E.

Ingersoll, Marian Beverly Ingersoll, Leland R. Ingersoll,
and

Evelyn

E.

(hereinafter

Ingersoll,

referred

to

dated
as

September
the

"order

4,

198 6

denying

intervention").
2.

Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment

against

Defendant, dated

September

4,

1986

(hereinafter

referred to as "summary judgment order").
The motions in question are contained in a single pleading
dated September 13, 1986 and filed on September 15, 1986.

It

0out?

1

PAGE TWO

INTERSTATE V. PATTERSON

OPINION AND ORDER

was plaintiff, however, that caused the motions to be heard by
the court on October 20, 1986, by its filing of a Notice of
Hearing.
The court heard the arguments of counsel on October 20,
1986, at 2:00 o'clock p.m., and took the matter under advisement*
Thereafter,

the

court

reviewed

the

entire

file,

including

specifically the plaintiff's original Motion for Summary Judgment
and

supporting

Proposed

papers, the

Complaint

original Motion to Intervene

and

in Intervention and the transcript of the

hearing of May 5, 1986 on the plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment

and

proposed

Intervenors'

Motion

to

Intervene

(hereinafter sometimes referred to as "the original motions").
The following procedural facts are significant:
1.

The original motions were fully presented to the court

and argued on May 5, 1986.

No legal memoranda, brief or

evidence were submitted by the defendant or the proposed
Intervenors.

At that hearing, counsel for the proposed

Intervenors proposed to submit a post hearing memorandum
(Tr. p. 13) but none was forthcoming.
2.

The court, per Judge Fishier, took the matter under

advisement and thereafter issued his ruling by means of a
minute entry dated July 28, 1986.
3.

Proposed written orders incorporating the court's ruling

were mailed by plaintiff to opposing counsel on August 1,
1986.

Defendant and proposed Intervenors did not object to
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Thus, a challenge to the entry of the summary

judgment order cannot be premised on subdivisions (a) or (d) of
Rule 59.

Additionally, Rule 52(b) is inapplicable to the summary

judgment proceedings.
The remaining question under Rule 59 is whether subdivision
(e) is a proper vehicle to challenge the rendering of a summary
judgment.

Depending

question,

a

further

on

the

issue

resolution

may

be

of

this

remaining

whether

Rule

59(e)

is

appropriate to challenge a summary judgment when no new evidence,
fact or even legal argument is presented in support of the Rule
59(e) motion.
Rule 59(e), which is identical to Rule 59(e) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, has been a part of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure from their inception.

Rule 59(e) was, however,

an addition to the federal rules in the 1946 amendments.
Advisory

Committee Notes to the

federal

rules

indicate

The
that

subdivision (e) was M... added to care for a situation such as
that arising in Boaz v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, ... 146
F.2d

321 [(8th Cir. 1944)] and makes clear that the district

court possesses the power asserted in that case to alter or amend
a judgment after its entry.11

In Boaz the court held that the

district

power

court

had

inherent

to

amend

dismissal without prejudice to a judgment
prejudice.

a

judgment

of dismissal

of

with

While such power of amendment inheires in the court

rendering the judgment, the use of Rule 59(e) for amendment of
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and briefs and be heard at oral argument.

Following any hearing

and while the court has the matter under advisement, the party
opposing the motion may make further submissions.

Even if the

matter is not taken under advisement, a signed judgment is always
necessary under Rule 58A.

Rule 2.9 of the District Court Rules

of Practice requires service of a proposed judgment on opposing
counsel and allows five days for objection.
final judgment be entered.

Only then can the

Thus# Rule 2.9 provides the opposing

party with an opportunity by means of objection to convince the
court that its previously

ruling was erroneous.

No

further

mechanism for reconsideration is necessary or desirable.
The instant case is illustrative.

The plaintiff originally

presented this matter to the court on May 5, 1986, in a hearing
on its Motion for Summary Judgment.
file

papers,

Defense counsel had the

opportunity

to

memoranda,

opposition.

No such items were filed.

and

affidavits

in

Counsel for the proposed

Intervenors filed a Motion to Intervene and a Proposed Complaint
in

Intervention.

At the hearing

on plaintiff's Motion

for

Summary Judgment, defense counsel and counsel for the proposed
Intervenors were heard.
The court thereafter had the matter under advisement for
over two months during which time defendants and the proposed
Intervenors made no filings or submissions.
the proposed

While counsel for

Intervenors did propose to file a post hearing

memorandum (Tr. p. 13) # none was forthcoming.

It is particularly

GG01S3

INTERSTATE i

significant

PATTERSON

that

I n t e l veiitir

at

'

u

PAGE SEVEN

tame

fait,

, : th-

ropcsed

Following tat ntJ i\« e ei.i : ^ .,:

l^Rfi, wh u ii w a s m a i l e d to d u

ruling.

r^ndant

ul ini i I I i 11 d f 1 i

issue of material

proposed

have

OPINION AND ORDER

Interveners
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°_outh Memphis Lumber Co. . 531 F. 2d 1348, 1351-52 (6th Cir.

1976).
Hume v. Small Claims Court of Murray Citv, 590 P. 2d 309,
310-311 (Utah 1979) addresses the issue from the standpoint of a
denial of a petition for a writ of mandamus.

To that extent it

is instructive but not controlling in the context of a summary
judgment.

In the latter context many more opportunities are

generally

available

for

parties

and

advocates

to

present

argument.

Parties opposing summary judgment are also generally

presented an opportunity by means of objections under Rule 2.9 to
convince the court prior to entry of judgment that its ruling was
erroneous.
Even if Rule 59(e) was generally deemed a proper mechanism
to challenge a summary judgment, it should not be deemed a proper
use of such mechanism when no new fact, piece of evidence or even
legal argument is presented in support of a Rule 59(e) motion or
when a party opposing summary judgment fails to object to a
proposed judgment under Rule 2.9.

Under such circumstances, the

party opposing summary judgment should pursue their remedy by
appeal rather than a motion for reconsideration under the guise
of Rule 59(e).
For the reasons set forth above, defendant's Rule 59 motions
are denied as being improperly premised on Rule 59.

Proposed

Intervenors1 motion for reconsideration cannot even be deemed to
be premised

on Rule 59 since they were not parties to the
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defendant's and proposed Interveners' motions under Rule 59(a)(6)
and

(7), 59(d),

59(e)#

60(b), U.R.C.P., "or other applicable

rules" are hereby denied.

DATED THIS 2nd day of December, 1986.

ATTEST
_______
/"'" '"b^utyCtari/

MICHAEL R. MURPHY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Memorandum Opinion and Order, postage prepaid, to
Ronald C. Barker, Esq.
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
84115-3692
Patrick O'Hara, Esq.
P.O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah
84145
Ralph J. Hafen, Esq.
402 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
This y ? w

84101

day of December, 1986.
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David B. Boyce
of BACKMAN, C L A M U MARSH
Attorneys for Interveners
500 American Savings Building
61 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 841 1 1
Telephone 531-8300
I N T H E DISTRICT COURT

LAK£

•

,,C

-.CL£RK

UOUNTY

STAT
*****
vJVINT

SALT LA! I"- I,
Plaintiff,

C i v i l No, 78-7764

vs ,
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY CO.
Defendant.

LEilEL CORPORATION, MELVIN E .
INGERSOLL, MARIAN INGERSOLL,
his wife, LELAND R. INGERSOLL,
EVELYN E, INGERSOLL, his wift ,
Interveners,
vs
-•iGUNwM., FUEL SUPPLY CO. a n d
-'ALT ; U-:E C I T Y

ndant and
*

*****

Come n o w f *- ( imervener^ and for cause of ac11 on
agains*- rk» Plaintiff a c Pefendant pitac a m allege a^ follows:
Ir

ti.i owners c certa:

n. ».u

"1.5

proft.:

real
, . as the

ju t *

p ropeBrew*

Interveners ai

a

nan., a i a i L

cinii;

ui

i u r ^ :t tnar'e** of *-*'•-: a c t i o n .

real
d

sub. •
iHr fwrr ; Mr

uLjwCt matter real property consists of
First South St:<-*c*. aid Glendale Street and those portions more

particularly described in Plaintiff's complaint.
3.

That at some time prior to October 15, 1977, the

Defendant petitioned the Plaintiff for passage of ordinances
that would vacate certain portions of those streets as dedicated
public thoroughfares.
4.

That in August or September, 1977, the Defendant,

by and through its authorized agent, contacted Melvin E.
Ingersoll and inquired of him whether the Interveners objected
to ordinances vacating First South Street west of 1100 West and
that portion of Glendale Street north of 100 South Street and
First South Street between 10th and 11th West,
5.

That Melvin E. Ingersoll informed the Defendant's

agent that Interveners had no reason to want the aforementioned
vacation, and would strongly oppose any attempt to vacate First
South Street between 10th and 11th West.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
6.

Interveners incorporate by reference the allegations

contained in paragraphs 1 through 5 of Interveners1 amended complaint.
7.

That because of the Interveners' objection to the

proposed vacation by the Defendant, Melvin E. Ingersoll and the
Defendant's agent agreed that they would both determine the
possibilities of having the Plaintiff or others construct certain
overpasses over the railroad and an off ramp from the freeway
to provide additional access to the Brewery Mall in exchange for
an agreement by the Interveners that they would sign the petition
for the vacation of First South Street west of 1100 West and that
portion of Glendale Street north of 100 South Street.
Ingersoll also agreed that if the overpasses

Melvin E.

and off ramp were

acquired, that Interveners would not object to the petition to
vacate First South Street between 10th and 11th West.

That

Defendant agreed not to petition for the vacation of First South
-2-

Street between 10th and 11th West until f.W possibilities for
the oft ramp anil overpasses were determint , and agr

' to give

the interveners actual notice of any attempt Lo petition loi the
vacation of First, South between 10th and llch Went.,
That t'he Defendant breai. Utd tiaid agreement by

Hi

petitioning the Plaintift t'oi* the vacation of First South between
10th and llLh West prior to at tempting to obtain the overpasses
and off ramp and without giving notice to the Interveners, or
any of them.
n

™-—

;

....rsuant to the neti-. i,

el i.^ Defendant

the Plaintitt enacted an ordinance vacating First Sourr. *~ *» *-•
10th an, . L*

^i * Lo the damage ai

derri..- :

-

1..

-:.at the Interveners

II

That L Lie agreement between the Defendant and

v - >

^ a u ^ t w remedy

at law.

Interveners should he specifically enforced to gi\,tj the parties
an opportunity to determine if the overpasses and off ramp can
he acquired and to give the Interveners the right lo timely
object, lo the petition to vacate First South between 10th ,nnl
11th West and Lo rescind their consent to the othe' peti'. i ,»u.
1,2

That, Lite Plaintiff has already determined th.it

there is not good cause for said vacation and th.it such vacation,
would be detrimental Co f hi' M H I nt i f t „ the Interveners and the
public in general.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
I terveners incorporate by reference the allegations
contaiLc

. paragraphs 1 through 12 of Intervener:,

amended

complain; .
<. : o D t :
agent requested Mei\
the vacatiwi* ci F^L^L

lngersc
auutn

* e*
-3-

t-*
«

]

'

Del en
'
.dt

* S

portion of Glendale Street north of 100 South Street.
15.

That the Defendants agent failed to disclose

to Melvin E. Ingersoll that Defendant was pursuing and intended
to pursue its petition to vacate that portion of First South
Street between 10th and 11th West.
16.

That Interveners executed the petition on the

assumption that Defendant would not and was not petitioning or
pursuing its petition for the vacation of First South Street
between 10th and 11th West.
17.

That the omission of the Defendant constituted

a misrepresentation concerning a presently existing material
fact which falsely deceived the Interveners into signing the
petition and the defendant knew that it did so and that
Interveners would not have signed the petition with knowledge
of Defendant's intention and the omission was done for the
purpose of inducing the Interveners to sign the petition and
the Interveners acted reasonably and in ignorance of the
Defendant's intent and relied upon the information given with
the understanding that there was no intent to attempt to vacate
First South Street between 10th and 11th West.
18.

That as a result of the omission, the Interveners

have been damaged.
19.

That Interveners have no adequate remedy at law.

20.

That Interveners should now be given an opportunity

to present their objections to the petition that resulted in the
ordinance vacating that portion of First South Street between
10th and 11th West and said objections should be considered to
be timely and the ordinances should be set aside.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
21.

Interveners incorporate by reference the allegations

contained in paragraphs 1 through 20 of Interveners' amended
complaint.
-4-
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Interveners.

That said vacations were done at the insistence

of the Defendant and the Defendant knew that the Plaintiff was
acting under the assumption of information that was, in fact,
erroneous, namely, that the Plaintiff was not the owner of the
underlying fee title to the subject matter property.
31. That said vacations were done without giving the
Interveners notice and an opportunity to be heard and said
vacations have damaged the Interveners.
32.

That the Interveners have been specifically damaged

by said vacations.
33.

That the Interveners do not have an adequate

remedy at law.
34.

That said vacations should be set aside.

WHEREFORE, Interveners pray judgment against the
Defendant as follows:
1.

For a judgment setting aside the ordinances that

were enacted by the Plaintiff that vacated First South Street west
of 1100 West and that portion of Glendale Street north of 100 South
Street and 1st South Street between 10th and 11th West.
2.

For an injunction enjoining the Defendant permanently

from interfering with the subject matter property and the use
thereof by the public as a public thoroughfare.
3.

For a judgment specifically enforcing the agreement

between the Defendant and the Interveners and giving the Interveners
the right to timely present their objections to said vacations to
the Plaintiff and giving the Plaintiff an opportunity to timely
re-examine whether the subject matter property should be vacated.
4.

For judgment against the Defendant enforcing the

promises of the Defendant and estopping Defendant from claiming
any right, title or interest in the subject matter real property.
5.

Alternatively, for judgment for damages in an amount
-6-

to be determined as a result of the acts, conduct and omissions
of the Defendant as set forth herein.
6.

For costs of Court and any other relief the Court

deems just in the premises.
Against the Plaintiff, Salt Lake City, as follows:
1.

For judgment setting aside the vacation ordinances.

2.

Alternatively, for judgment for damages in an amount

to be determined as a result of the acts, conduct and omissions
of the Plaintiff as set forth herein.
3.

For costs of Court and any other relief the Court

deems just in the premises.
Dated this

3>Q

day of A y t t l

, 1979.

BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH

UbJuL

David B. Boyce

S.

<^t-

Attorneys for Interveners
500 American Savings Builc
61 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on t h e ^ Q day of
— —j—
1979, a copy of the foregoing Amended Complaint was mailed, postage
prepaid, as follows:
James S. Lowrie
Thomas E. K. Cerruti
JONES, WALDO, H0LBR00K & McDONALD
Attorneys at Law
800 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Judy F. Lever
Assistant City Attorney
101 City & County Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Ingersolls* Proposed Complaint in Intervention

Exhibit "c"

Ronald C. Barker #0208
Attorney for intervenors
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 841io-3692
Telephone (801) 486-9636
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
INTERSTATE LAND CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,
vs,
C85-0790

R. D. PATTERSON,
Defendant.

Judge Phillip R. Fishier

MELVIN E. INGERSOLL, MARIAN
BEVERLY INGERSOLL, LELAND R.
INGERSOLL and EVELYN E.
INTERSOLL,
Plaintiffs in Intervention,
vs*

COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION

INTERSTATE LAND CORPORATION,
and R. D. PATTERSON,
Defendants in Intervention,
ooOoo
Plaintiffs in intervention, herein referred to collectively
as ("INGERSOLLS"), answer the allegations in the main complaint
herein so far as they relate to the disputed property described
below, and complain and allege as follows:
INTERVENORS' ANSWER TO INTERSTATE'S COMPLAINT
Intervenors answer the complaint of Interstate Land Corporation

("INTERSTATE") on file herein by admitting, denying and

alleging as follows:

PIRST DEFENSE
(Failure to State Claim)
Plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim for relief upon
which relief may be granted.

Among other things, plaintiff has

failed to allege that plaintiff's "predecessor or grantor" was
"seized or possessed of the property in question within seven
years" as required by 78-12-5, 78-12-6, et seq.r OCA, 1953.
SECOND DEFENSE
(Patterson & Ingersolls1 Title by Adverse Possession)
Each of the four Ingersolls are the owner of an undivided 1/5
interest and defendant R. D. Patterson ("PATTERSON") is the owner
of an undivided 1/5 interest in and to said property.

At all

time from and after October, 1977, Ingersolls and Patterson have
been in actual physical possession of and have visibly, openly,
notoriously,

continuously

possessed

and

used

the

disputed

property under a claim of title and ownership thereto, which
claim has at all times been hostile and adverse to the claims of
all persons and organization, including the claims of Interstate
and of the persons and organizations through whom
claims to have derived its title.

Interstate

The disputed property has been

disposed of by Salt Lake City within the meaning of 78-12-13,
UCA, 1953. Ingersolls and Patterson have been in "the exclusive,
continuous and adverse possession of such real estate" for "more
than seven years subsequent to such conveyance" and are "purchasers" within the meaning of said statute. Accordingly, Ingersolls

- 2 -

and

Patterson

have acquired

property as provided therein.

"adverse

title" to the disputed

In the alternative, Ingersolls and

Patterson have acquired title to the disputed parcel by adverse
possession as provided in 78-12-7, 78-12-7.1, 78-12-8, 78-12-9,
78-12-10, 78-12-11, 78-12-12, 78-12-21.1, 78-12-16, 78-12-17 and
other applicable statutes pertaining to acquisition of title to
real property by adverse possession.
THIRD DEFENSE
(Statutory Time Bar to Plaintiff's Claims)
Plaintiff's claim is barred by the provisions of 78-12-5,
78-12-5.1,78-12-5.2,
78-12-9,

78-12-5.3,

78-12-10, 78-12-11, UCA,

statuts of limitations.
barred

78-12-6,

under

those

78-12-7,

1953, and

other

78-12-8,
applicble

Among other things plaintiff's claim is

statutes

since neither

plaintiff

nor

the

persons or organizations through whom it claims to have acquired
title have been in possession of the disputed property within
seven years prior to commencement of this action (or at all).
FOURTH DEFENSE
(Waiver and Estoppel)
Plaintiff has by its acts and/or omissions (and those of its
predecessors in alleged title) waived any claim that they may
have had to the disputed property and/or are now estopped to
assert said claims.

Among other things plaintiff's predecessor

in alleged title did not ask for or received a trust deed or
other security with respect to the disputed property, and as-

- 3 -

serted

no claim

to the disputed

notice of default

under

property when it caused the

the trust deed to be recorded.

See

allegations in ! 9 and 11 below.
FIFTH DEFENSE
(Response to Complaint)
Answering the numbered paragraphs of plaintiff's complaintf
intervenors admit, deny and allege as follows:
1.

Admit allegations in % 1 and 2.

2.

Admit allegations in 1 3, except deny that said property

(herein referred to as the "Disputed Property")
real property";
right,

title

or

allege
interest

affirmatively
thereon;

is "plaintiff's

that plaintiff

and

that

has no

Ingersolls

and

Patterson are the owners of said property as appears more fully
in the complaint in intervention (below).
3.

Deny allegations

in K 4.

Allege affirmatively

that

plaintiff has no rightf title or interest in and to said property
as appears more fully in the complaint in intervention (below).
4.

Admit allegations in X 5.

Allege affirmatively that both

defendant Patterson and defendants Ingersolls are in possession
of said property and claim ownership thereof.
5.

Deny allegations in H 6 and all other allegations in

plaintiff's complaint not specifically admitted herein.

- 4 -

COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Quiet Title)
6.

The main action herein is a quiet-title lawsuit seeking

to determine

ownership

of

a disputed

("DISPUTED PROPERTY") located

parcel of

real

property

in Salt Lake County, Utah, which

premies are described:
(a)

in exhibit "A" to the complaint of plaintiff Interstate

Land Corporation
(b)

("INTERSTATE"),

in the quit-claim

deed

of July

27, 1979

from

Lemel

Corporation ("LEMEL") to defendant R. D. Patterson ("PATTERSON"),
a copy of which is attached hereto as exhibit " I " ,
(c)
from

as parcels #8 and 9 in the Trustees Deed of June 3, 1982

NACM

("GENERAL

International
BREWING"),

a

("NACM")
copy

of

to
which

General
is

Brewing

attached

Company

hereto

as

exhibit "II", and are
(d)

also shown in the plot map attached as exhibit "C" to

the affidavit

of Raymond

L. Griffith

filed

herein, a copy of

which is attached hereto as exhibit "III".
7.

The disputed property was the West half of Glendale and

the South half of First South Streets, West of 1100 West in Salt
Lake City, Utah, as vacated

by

the City

of

Salt

Lake

by

an

ordinance passed by the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City,
Utah on October 5, 1977, a copy of which is attached hereto as
exhibit "IV" (see also plot map, exhibit "III" hereto).
8.

At the time that said streets were vacated each of the

- 5 -

four Ingersolls (plaintiffs in intervention) were the owners of
an undivided 1/5 and and Lemel was the owner o£ an undivided 1/5
of the real property abutting ("ABUTTING PROPERTY") the disputed
property.

By operation of law when said streets were vacated fee

title to an undivided 1/5 of the disputed property reverted to
and vested

in each of the four Ingersolls and Lemel.

Lemel

thereafter conveyed its undivided 1/5 ownership interest in and
to the disputed

property

to Patterson

by a quit-claim

deed,

exhibit "I" hereto.
9.

The abutting property was pledged by Ingersolls and Lemel

as security for an obligation owed by them to General Brewing by
a trust deed executed in July, 1977, a copy of which is attached
hereto as exhibit "V".

The disputed property was not pledged as

security for said debt by said trust deed.
10.

After acqisition of title to the disputed property (May,

1980) Ingersolls conveyed their interest in the abutting property
to Lemel by quit-claim deed, a copy of which is attached hereto
as exhibit "VI", and Lemel thereupon became owner of 100% of the
abutting

property.

Ingersolls

did

not

convey

the

disputed

property to Lemel.
11.

Lemel failed to pay the obligation secured by the trust

deed (exhibit "V") and General Brewing caused a notice of default
of said trust deed to be filed about September, 1979, a copy of
which is attached as exhibit "VII".

In said notice of default

General Brewing asserted no claim to the disputed property.
12.

Thereafter Lemel filed a petition in bankruptcy in the
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United States District Court for the District of Utahf Central
Division, case No. 80-00755.

The disputed property was not

listed as an asset of Leroel in the bankruptcy.
13.
Leroel.

In that bankruptcy NACM was appointed as trustee of
By a "Trustees Deed" (exhibit "II" hereto) NACM sold and

conveyed the abutting property (parcels #1 thru 7) and purported
to sell the disputed property

(parcels #8 and 9) to General

Brewing.
14.

General Brewing purported to convey the disputed prop-

erty to Interstate by a special warranty deedf a copy of which is
attached as exhibit "VIII".
15.

Since Leroel did not have title to the disputed property

exhibit "II" conveyed nothing to General Brewing and the deed
froro General

Brewing

to

nothing to Interestate.

Interstate

(exhibit

"VIII") conveyed

However, said deeds cloud the title to

Ingersolls and Patterson to the disputed property.
should quiet title to a 1/5

The Court

interest in and to the disputed

property in the naroes of each of the Ingersolls and Patterson,
and declare that Interstate has no right, title or

interest

therein.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Adverse Possession)
16.

Intervenors incorporate herein by reference thereto all

of the allegations contained in 1 6 thru 15 above.
17.

At all time froro and after October, 1977, Ingersolls and

Patterson have been in actual physical possession of and have

- 7 -

visibly, openly, notoriously, continuously possessed and used the
disputed property under a claim of title and ownership thereto,
which claim has at all tiroes been hostile and adverse to the
claims of all persons and organization, including the claims of
Interstate

and

of

the persons and organizations

through whom

Interstate claims to have derived its title.
18.

The disputed property has been disposed of by Salt Lake

City within the meaning of 78-12-13, UCA, 1953.

Ingersolls and

Patterson have been in "the exclusive, continuous and adverse
possession

of

such

real

estate" for

"more

than

seven

years

subsequent to such conveyance" and are "purchasers" within the
meaning of said statute.
have

acquired

"adverse

provided therein.

Accordingly, Ingersolls and Patterson
title"

to

the

disputed

property

as

In the alternative, Ingersolls and Patterson

have acquired title to the disputed parcel by adverse possession
as provided in 78-12-7, 78-12-7.1, 78-12-8, 78-12-9, 78-12-10,
78-12-11,

78-12-12, 78-12-21.1, 78-12-16, 78-12-17

and

other

applicable statutes pertaining to acquisition of title to real
property by adverse possession.
WHEREFORE, Ingersolls as intervenors pray for judgment as
follows:
19.

Quieting title to a 1/5 undivided interest in and to the

disputed property

in the names of Melvin E. Ingersoll, Marian

Beverly Ingersoll, Leland R. Ingersoll, Evelyn E. Ingersoll and
R. D. Patterson against

the claims of Interstate and of all

- 8 -

persons or organizations claiming by, under or through Interstate.
20.

For such damages as the Court determines to have been

sustained by intervenors as a proximate result of the improper
claims and acts of Interstate.
21.

For interest, costs, a reasonable attorney's fee and for

such other and further relief as the Court deems proper.
Dated the 3rd day of May, 1986.

Ttonald C. Barker
Attorney for Ingersolls
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing to be
mailed, postage prepaid, the 3rd day of May, 1986, to each of the
following person at the addresses indicated:
Patrick J. OfHara, Esq., P. 0. Box 45340, Salt Lake City, Utah
84145, and to Ralph J. Hafen, Esq., 402 Kearns Building, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84101.

Ronald C. Barker
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SCHEDULE "A"

Beginning at the Southeast corner of Lot 1,
Block 1, JONES' SUBDIVISION, Block 54, Plat
"C" Salt Lake City Survey, said point also
being the Northwest corner of 1100 West and
First South Streets; and running thence South
0°2*53M East 132.17 feet; thence West 334.00
feet; thence North 0°00'55" West 214.63 feet
to the Northeast corner of Lot 1, Block 2,
said JONES' SUBDIVISION; thence North 33°42'
East 59.48 feet; thence East 36.00 feet to
the Northwest corner of Lot 2, Block 1, said
JONES' SUBDIVISION; thence South 132.00 feet;
thence East 264.00 feet to the point of beginning .
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QUIT-CLAIM DEED

3655782

*~

r*o

[CORPORATE FORM]

j
LEMEL CORPORATION
f a corporation
j organized and existing under the laws of the State of Utah, with its principal office at
S a l t Lake C i t y
, of County of
S a l t Lake
, State of Utah,
j grantor, hereby QUIT CLAIMS to
:

R.D. PATTERSON
of

Salt Lake County
Ten and no/100
— •--— • —
and other good and valuable considerations
the following described tract of land in
S a l t Lake
State of Utah:

grantee
for the sum of
" DOLLARS,
County,

The West h a l f of Glendale and South h a l f of
F i r s t South S t r e e t s , west of 1100 West i n
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah, as vacated by the
City of S a l t Lake by an ordinance passed
by the Board of Commissioners of S a l t Lake
C i t y , Utah on the 5th day of October, 1977
and p u b l i s h e d on the 15th day of October,
1977, the e n t i r e t y of s a i d Glendale and
F i r s t South S t r e e t s west of 1100 West being
more p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s c r i b e d as f o l l o w s :
(See Schedule

H

A,f a t t a c h e d )

i
The officers who sign this deed hereby certify that this deed and the transfer represented
I thereby was duly authorized under a resolution duly adopted by the board of directors of the
; grantor at a lawful meeting duly held and attended by a quorum.
!
In witness whereof, the grantor has caused its corporate name and seal to be hereunto affixed
I by its duly authorized officers this 2 7 t h
day of
July
, A. D. 1979
Attest:
Secreta
[CORPORATE SEAL]

! STATE OF UTAH,

President. \

^

TRUSTEE'S DEED

fYfZt-

THIS INDENTURE, Made this 3rd

day of June, 1982,

3682*90
betveen NACM INTERMOUNTAIN, tha duly appointed, qualified and
actJ eg Trustee of tha estate of LeMel Corporation, and
GENirAL BREWING COMPANYJ
W I T N E S S E T H :
WHEREAS, by an Order duly made and entered on the 27th
day of May, 1982 by tha United States Bankruptcy Court for
the District of Utah, Central Division, the Honorable Ralph R.
Mabey, U. S. Bankruptcy Judge presiding, in proceedings then
pending in said court entitled "In rat LeMel Corporation,
Debtor* No. 80-00755, NACM Intermountain, in its capacity as
Trustee of the estate in Bankruptcy of LeMel Corporation, was
duly authorized and empowered to convey all of the right, .title
and interest of LeMel Corporation, the Debtor, and all right,
title and interest of the estate of the Debtor in the real
property hereinafter described to General Brewing Company?
and said court having determined that the requirements of Notice
and hearing under Section 11 U.S.C. $363(b) have bsen net?
NOW, THEREFORE, NACM Intermountain, in its capacity as
Trustee of tha estate or LeMel Corporation, by virtue of the
power and authority. In it, yes ted aa aforesaid, and In consideration of the S U B of Ten and no/100 Dollars ($10*00) and other
valuable consideration to it in hand paid by General Brewing
Company, tha receipt of which ia heraby acknowledged, does hereby
quit-claim and convey unto tha said General Brewing Caspany,

all of the right, titla and interest of LeMal Corporation and

g

fj

all of tha right, titla and intarast of tha estate in '.bankruptcy

K

of V\Mel Corporation, in and to that certain real property .,

3,

altutte, lyittg and being in tha County of Salt Lake, State of
j$
Utah, aubject to two leases, each for.a term of years,
certain
*
s, certain ' 4

IS.*. "*

» "1 ^Jfc-—

osort •

EXHIBIT

month-to-month tenancies, and certain interests, ri<jnts of
way and «aaemente hereinafter deecrlb.d. but otherwise free
and clear of all H e m and other interests, more particularly
described as follows to witt

all of Block *3, Flat » C , Salt Lake City Survey

Beginning at the Northeast corner of Lot 8, Block 43, flat
*C", Salt Lake City Surrey and running thence fart 4 feetj
thence South 660 feet; thence Vest 4 feet to the Southeast
corner of Lot 1 of said Block 43? thence Worth 660 feet
to the point of beginning*
PAfCfL fO, 1;

Beginning at the Southv*rt corner of said Block 43, and
running thence Vest 99 <'*et; thence ltorth 2*7.5 feet; thecce
Vest 163 f e e t , tore or l e s s , to the East bank of the Jordan
Blver; thence Northerly along said East bsnk to a point
due Vest froa the lorthwest corner of said Block 43; thtnee
Esst to the Northwest corner of said Block *3» thence South
660 feet to the point of beginning.

All of the South h t l f of vacated First South Street lying
between the Vest line of Glendale Street produced and the
East Bank of the Jordan River.

Cioncncing at the Southwest corner of Hook 44, flat *C*,
Suit Lake City Survey, end running thence Worth 10 rodei
thence Esst 10 r o d s : thonce South 10 rode; thence Vest
10 rode to the point of beginning.

a l l of Lot 3, Blook 1, JOKES S0BDZYZ320B of Blook 54, f l i t Z
•C% Salt Uke City Survey.
K
Together v l t h the east h t l f of vacated Olendele Street co
•dJoining on the Vest.

g

-i-

mciwuL-ii
A l l of Lota 1 and 2 1 , f l o o k f, JOKIS SUBDXfXSlOl of Block
3a f f l a t •<:•, S a l t Lake City Suf*ay,
T o o t h e r w i t h tha f o l l o w i n g d a a e r i b e d p o r t i o n o f vacated
Q l a n 4 a l a S t r e e t a d j o i n i n g on tha S t a t s C ^ o a t a o l n t 8 2 . 3
f a a t Hortc f r o i tha S o u t h e a e t c o r n e r of Lot 1, H o c k 2 ,
aald J0NC3 SUBDIVISION, and running t h t n c a Horth t'< f a s t
t o t h a H o r t h e i a t o o r n « f of s a i d U*. 2 3 ; t h a n c a Saat 33
f s e t ; thanca South 3 i # » 2 l * e a t 3 9 . * * f a a t t o t h a p o i n t
of cocsonctr.ont.
T o g e t h e r with tha Worth o n e - h a l f of f a c a t t d F i r s t
S t r e e t a d j e i n i n j on tha South.

South

PARCEL NO, 8*
Tho following described portion of vacated First'South
Street being tha South one-!»alf of vacated First South
Street lying between the Weit line of 1100 West: Street
and the West line of Clendala Street produced across First
South Streets Beginning at a point 66*045 faat South of
the Noxthweat Corner of 1100 West and 100 South, which
corner ia aia > tha Southeast Corner of Lot 1, Block 54,
Plat *C*, Salt Lake City Survey, and running thanca
South 66.043 feet} thence West 330.0 feet; thence North
66.045 feet) thenca Eaat 330.0 faat to tne point of
beginning.
PARCEL NO. 9:
The following descri.md portion of v a c i t e d Gler-Jale S t r e e t s
Bee inning at the Sov heaat cornor of Lot 1, Blcck 2e Jones
S u b d i v i s i o n of Block 54, P l a t *C", S a l ; LaX i C t y Survey
and running thenca Ntrth 82.5 f e e t i thence Nox .- 33* 42*
Cast 59.48 f e e t ; thence South 132.0 f e e t thenci West 33
f e e t t o tha p o i n t of beginning.
Together with the North one-half of vacated F i r s t South
S t r e e t adjoining on tha South.
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EXHIBIT "Ii:

ATE OF UTAH,
ty and County of Salt Lake,
I,

\
| ss.
)

Mildred V. Higham

f City

Recorder of Salt Lake City, Utah, do hereby

rtify that the attached document is a full, true and correct copy of

B i l l No. 173, an

ordinance v a c a t i n g Glendale and F i r s t South S t r e e t s west of 1100 West
S t r e e t l o c a t e d in S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah,

>assed by the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City, Utah,

October 5 f

1977

is appears of record in my office.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the corporate seal of said
City, this
(SEAL)

21st

day of

December

1978

City Recorder

EXHIBIT

AN ORDINANCE
AN ORDINANCE VACATING Glendale and First South
Streets west of UOO West Street
located in Salt Lake D r y , Utah.
Be It ordained by the Board of
Commissioner* of Salt Lake
City. Utah.
SECTION V That Glendale
and First South Streets west of
1100 West Street located in Salt
Lane City, Utah, more particularly described as follows be,
and the same hereby Is. vacated and declared no longe*- to
be public property tor use as a
Street, tvtnvt. alley or pedesfrian w a v
Beginning at me Southeast
corner o» Lot 1, Block 1. Jones'
Subdivision. Block $4 Plat " C " ,
Salt Lake City Survey, said
point also being me Northwest
corner of 1100 West end First
South Streets, and running
thence South V T S3" East
133 17 feet, thence West 334.00
feet, thence North 0* 00 55"
West J l i 63 feet to me North
east corner of Lot I. Block 7,
said Jones' Subdivision: thence
North 3J 4? East $9 48 tee',
mence East 36.00 feet to me
Northwest corner of Lot 7,
Block l. said Jones' Subdivilion, thence Sooth 13? 00 feet.
thence East 3*4 00 feet to pomt
Of beginning Contains Si. 113 32
•Quart feet, or M I 0 acres
Said vacation Is made e«•ressty subied to an eiisting
rights of wav and easements of
an public utilities of any and
every description now located
on. In. under or over me
confines o* the above described
property, and also subfect to
the rights of entry thereon for
the purpose of maintaining.
altering, repairing, replacing.
removing or rerouting said
uliitt.es and all of them
SECTION 1 This ordinance
Shan fake effect 30 days after
Its first publication
Passed by the Board of Com.
missioners of San Lake City,
Utah, this Sm day of October.
1?77.
T E D L. WILSON
Mayor
M I L D R E D V. MIGHAM
Cltv Recorder
(SEAL)
BILL NO 173 of W 7
Pubiitnati October IS. 1f77
CB-6)

THIS TRUST DEED Is Bade this

6 — d a y of July, 1977, between

LEMEL CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, and MELVIN E. INGERSOLL end KAR1AN
BEVERLY INGERSOLL, his wife, and LELAN2 R. INGERSOLL and EVELYN E. INGERSOLL,
his wife, as Trustors, all of Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Stare of
Utah, BACKMAN ABSTRACT & TITLE COMPANY, as Trustee, and GENERAL BREWING COMPANY,
a California corporation, as Beneficiary.
Trustor hereby CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, WITH POWER
OF SALE, the. following described property situated in Salt Lake County, State
of Utah:

PARCEL 1;

All of Block 43, Plat

f,

C M t Salt Lake City Survey.

PARCEL 2: Beginning at the Northeast corner of Lot B, Block 43,
Plat M C M , Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence East 4 feet;
thence South 660 feet; thence Vest 4 feet to the Southeast corner
of Lot 1 of said Block 43; thence North 660 feet to the point of
beginning.
PARCEL 3: Beginning at the Southwest corner of said Block 43, and
running thence Vest 99 feet; thence North 247o5 feet; thence Vest 163
feet, core or less, to the East Bank of the Jordan River; thence
Northerly along said East Bank to a point due Vest froo the Northwest
c o m e r of said Block 43; thence East to the Nort>west corner of said
Block 43; thence South 660 feet to the point of beginning.
PARCEL A: All of the South half of vacated First South Street lying
between the Vest line of Cleodale Street produced and the East Bank of
the Jordan River.
PARCEL 5: Commencing at the Southwest corner of Block 44, ,s,lat " C M ,
Salt Lake City Survey,and running thence North 10 rods; thence East
10 rods; thence South 10 rod:;; thence Vest 10 reds to the point of
beginning.
PARCEL 6s All of Lot 3, Block 1, JONES SUBDIVISION of Block 54, Plat
M
C", Salt 1~* e City Survey.
Together with the East half of vacated Clendale Street adjoining
on the Wr.t.
PARCEL 7: All of Lots 1 and 23, Block 2, JONES SUBDIVISION of Block 54,
Plat "C", S^lt Lake City Survey.
Together with the following described portion of vacated Clendale Street adjoining on the East: Comoencing 82.5 feet North froo the
Southeast corner of Lot 1, Block 2, said JONES SUBDIVISION, and running
thence North 66 feet to the Northeast corner of said Lot 23; thence East
33 feit; thenc« South 33*42* West 59.48 feet to the point of comsenceoent.
Together with the North one-half of vacated First South Street
adjoin*LI; on the South.
SUBJECT TO TliE F0LL0VING:
1.

An easement for construction and maintenance of an underground conduit along
the following described line:

BEGINNING 45.23 feet West of the City Engineer's M O M A C M
on 10th West Street *»d 56 feet South of City Engineer**
Monument on First Souih Street, ind running t^snee West
327.27 feet; as created in favor of Utah Power and Light
CoDpany, a corporation, by instrument recorded November 18,
3916 as Entry No. 369^08, Book 3-C, Page 218.
Right of Way for a Railroad spur tract, said right of way being 8-1/2
feet on each side of, and measured at right angles to, the following
described center line:
BEGINNING at a point West 411.* feet free the Southwest
corner of the Intersection of 10th West Street and First
South Street, running thence Southerly on a 15*30* curve
to the right A distance of 97.6 feet; thence Southerly on
a ta.igent to said curve 142,8 feet; thence on a 14* curve
to the left 172.2 feet to a point on the West line of 10th
West Street which point is North 113.3 feet from the North
line of Second South Street; as created in favor of the
Western Pacific Rfcilroad Company, a corporation,, by instrument
recorded June 27, 1921 as Entry Ho. 452855 in Book 11-1,
page 81.
By Agreemtr.t recorded September 9, 192i, Entry No. 542833 in Book 3-V,
page 573, 6aid Western Pacific Rallroai Cor.pany granted an easement and
right-of-way over a portion of above discribett tract to Oregon Short
tine Railroad Company.
An Agreement recorded September 9, 1925 as Lntry No. 542834 in Book 3-W,
pfige 338, by and between Oregon Short Line Railroad Co. and The Western
P.ic-fic Railroad Co. first parties, and Fisher Terminal Warehouse Co., a
corporation, second party, which provides for relocation of present
trackage and construction of additional trackage in accordance with a
plat marked Schedule M A" attached thereto.
A perpetual casement for the sole and exclusive use of Oregon Short Line
Railroad Company and the Western Pacific Railroad Company for a Right of
Way for their present spur tracks over the following described land, to wit:
An Irregular tract of land, being a part of Lot 6, Block 43,
Plat M C", Salt Lake City Survey, and those certain portions
of vacated First South Street (together with other property
not covered by this deed) more particularly described in
instrument recorded January 20, 1926 as Entry No. 551852 in
Book 3-X of Liens and Leases, page 252.
A Right of Way for the purpose of laying, maintaining, operating and removal
of a gas pipe line along the following described line:
BEGINNINC at the West line of 10th West Street, and running
West on First South Street, 15 feet South of the center line
thereof, to the Jordan F.ver; as created in favor of Utah Gas
6 Coke Company by instn.-aent recorded July 27, 1949, ss Entry
No. 637186 in Book 44, Page 589 of Official Records.

A Pole Line Easement over the following described center line:
BEGINNING at a point S;»ith 89*53'22" West 470 feet
from a Monument at the intersection of First South
and Glendale Strerta, and running thence South 0*12'22H
West 51 feet; thence North 89 # 5B'22 M Eest 436.8 feet;
as created in favor of Utah Po^er and Light Company, a
corporation, by instrument recorded August 23, 1945, as
Entry No. 1009&87 in Paok 434, Page 609 of Official
Records.

9
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7.

A Right of Way for a 3 inch vater pipeline along the following described
line:
BECINN1NC at a point South 123U jeci and East 313f> fret
from the Northwest comer of Section 2, Township 1 South,
Range 1 West, Salt take Base and Meridian, and Tunning
thence South 83*10f East 155 fest; thence South 25*30*
East 85 feet, as disclosed by Certificate of Appropriation
of Vater, recorded May 25, 1950, as Entry No. 1201402 in
Bc-jic 768, Page 266 of Official fcecrds

8.

A perpetual easement for a drainage ditrh along the :'©Tth sSde of Vest
First South Street, together with the right of the I i°y to enlarge said
ditch, as reserved by Salt Lake City i n instrument recorded September 22,
1925, as Entry Nn. 543644 in Book 12-H, page 524 of OKieial Records.

9.

A Pole Line Easemcrt granted to Ut;«h Power * Light Cocpany as recorded
January 16, 1 9 U . !i» Book 177",, Page 242, Entry No. 1756733, Official
Records, fo- th* election and continued maintenance, repair, alteration,
and replacem it o f the electric transmission distribution and telephone
circuits of ..»ie Grantee and two anchors and three poles along a line
described .•' cile*s:
BECINN N~ t a point vithin an existing transmission line which
is 900 feet South and 1139 feet East, more or less, from
the Northwest corner of Section 2, Township 1 Scuth, Rarge
1 West, Salt Lake Meridian, thence South 6*49' West 540 feet
on said land and being in Lots 3 and 6 of said Section 2.

10.

A Pole M " f > asecent granted to Utah Power & Light Company as recorded
January l'> . U l , in Book 1773, Page 243, Entry No. 1756734, Official
Records, i
.he erection and continued maintenance, repair, alteration,
and rej.la. • t of the electric transmission distribution and telephone
circuits of ne Grantee and one guy and 3 poles along a line described as
follows:
BEGINNING at a fence on the North boundary line of the Grantors'
land at a point 845 feet South and 1170 feet East, more or less,
from the Northwest corner of Section 2, Township 1 South, Range
1 Vest, Salt Lake Meridian, thence South 0*02' Last 740 feet,
more or less, to a fence on the South boundary line of said land
and being In Lots 3 and 6 of said Section 2.

11.

Any other rights of way and easements for roads, ditches, canals, utilities,
pipe lines, etc., which may exist over, under or across 6aid land.

TOGETHER WITH all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights,
rights-of-way, easemests, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditarints,
privileges and •PJ>J*JJtea£fic_e8 thereunto now or hereafter u9ed or enjoyed with said
property, or any part thereof;
FOR THE fBUPOSE OF SECURING payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a

o»
£

promissory note of enn date herewith, in the principal sum of $1,300,000.00, p a y a b l e ^
CO
to the order of Beneffciary at the times, in the manner and with in:erest aathen-in
3
set forth, and paymeat of any auma expended or advanced by Beneficiary to protect the ££
security hereof.

H*

Trustor a g r ccs to pay all .axeo and assessments on thv above proptrty,
to pay all charges

%nd

assessments on water or water stock used on ci v»th * n u

property, not to co^^t waste, to maintain adequate fire insurance on Improvements
un said property, *0 pay all costs and expenses of collecrion (including Trustee's
and attorney's fees ^n event of default, in payment of the Indebtedness secured
hereby) and to pay reasonable Trustee's fees for any of *hi services performed by
Xtus_t*j> hexeundfLV jj^j^jj^

* mexveyaxc*

h*T*>S.

The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of default
and of any notice Of g a i e hereunder be mailed to him at the address hereinbefore
set forth.

MELV1K E. INCERSOLL
MARIAN BEVERLY'IrtGERSpLt
LtlJSd^K. 1NGERS0LL

//
- ,

EVELY* E. I N 3 E R S 0 L L Q

STATE OF UTAH

)
ss
County of Salt Lak€;

^ * i s « t f t < h e 6 ^ day of Cfl^^/
' l 9 7 7 » P^J'sonally appeared befo
fore me
^fe^VTK'E., INRERSOl^ „ J>TB7I&BJ>I* *!>d JLEIAVD X, MPZXSDLL, 33 SBCTB13T?
t^>Rfc0.RA*19N, a Utah corporation, and each duly acknowledged to me that they
^exejut*^ the^foreg o i n g instrument on behalf of said corporation by authority of
oard of
''"aa4 ^Jl?l^rL°
j t f l 8 l t 0 nn ?J t h e t board
of directors
directors ofof said
said corporation
corporation and
and that
that each
each acknowledged
acknowled
c
s
d co
*2 ^ ^ ? ' f A K ¥
rporation executed the same and the seal affixed i s the seal of

V ?,,,,'".£V

'

Kr^&miMion expires J7h/

(7
9

tf7?

NOTARY gpfiLIC

Residing at £/UtrT

g

3
f/&A#fT

(STXf/

£

sOF \JTAH
STATE <

)
88

C o u n t y of

<i,Ot Lake!

*On the jfr^da
, 1977, ; srsonally appeared before
.. m ^ J W ^ N E. INGERSOLL, MARIAN BEVfffcLY 1NGKRS0LL, hie wife, and LELAND R. TKGERSOLL
/',>and EVELYN L. lNGERSOLLe his wife, signers of the within lt>« :ruxnent, who du3y
/ iJ ^jL^novM^a^d .to me that they executed the same.

\ ^Msc^^ionjxpires

- S ^ r t / Y.tf??

Residing at

frfr/fr/fa/1/+TT

(yrX«

9
2

8

Jfecorded at Hequeet © f . - . ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ r S ^ k ^ . ^ J ' ^

•t

~ M. Fee Paid %

by

_

~-J&-J%-*3^^
„

_ pep. Book.

.. Page

Moil tax notice to

Ref.:

«

Addrees...~

3431368

_...

QUIT CLAIM DEED

MELVIN E. INGERSOIL and KARL-:; BEVERLY rCERSOLL, his wife, and
LEL^ND R. INCERSOLL and EVELYN E. EJCERSOLL, his wife,
of
S a l t Lake City
. County of S a l t Lake
QUIT CLAIM to UMEL CORPORATION,

grantors
, State of Utah, hereby

of

for the r u m of

. . ^? . ,
.in^"t*or-otKr"coo3"an3"vaIuatIe °consI3eratIon7"
the following described tract of Janata
State of Ut ah to wit:

S a l t Lake

DOLLARS
Cennty.

^/C

*&

SEE SCHEDULE "A" ATTACHED HERETO

WITNESS the hand

of §oid p^antor , tb!

Signed in tho pretence of

^t-^V ! "^/' j ^vi.

STATE OF tJTAH.
County of
On the

Salt lake
day of

1* 80,
personally Appeared before me

(*y

•• <S -

CD

W2.VIN E. rtTERSOLL and mRIAN BEVERLY INCERSOL, his wife, and VDJttfl'J • r ' \ V • =r
INCERSOLL and EVELYN E. INCERSOLL . h i s wife
" • / ; i * .-•
fc
the iip>eis ol the foregoing instrument, who duly acknjwledtftd to m* that t he y executed the' tame.
^
.•^^JVCJLJ^^
1

l..j ;««n~ -;" •• •ir*"**!**. '*
My eon,m..,«o„ . . p l „ . . . . 1 : ^ 3 .

*

Notary Public, retu'ing at
^lt..Ute_Cl^,..Ucah.„..

T««e octp miMTto t«#cr**u.« rom t«oTO.«cco«oiN«. v e t ec*c« IN*, AND r r r c .

EXHIBIT "VI'

SCHEDULE "A"

Parcel 1:
All of Block A3, P l a t "C*\ Salt Lake City Survey.

Q jpq - <*/J~

Parcel 2s
BFGIKMNG at the Kortheast corner of Lot 8B Block A3,
Plat "C", Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence
(2^'^^
East A.O feet; thence So-ith 660.C feet: thence .Jest
A.G feet to the Southeast corner of Lot 1 of said Block
A3-; thence North 660.0 feet to the point of beginning.
Parcel 3:
BEGIKMNC at the Southwest corner of said BlocJ' A3, and
running thc~re Vest 99.0 feet; thence North 2A7.5 feet;
thence Vest 163.0 feet, core or le«s, to the Ea'-t Bank ~
of the Jordan River; thence Northerly along said East Ay &3~
Batik to a point due Vest fros the Northve»t corne- of
said Block A3; thence East to the Northvrst corner of
said Block A3; thence South 660.0 feet to the point
of beginning.

, )'
1'
,
^
"

Parcel A;
All of the South half of vacated First South Street lying
between th*» VI st line of Clendale Street produced and the
(East Bank of the Jordan Fiver.

/Z.

.^
i&

-

__
~7~ ,<- /

~J&\-Ztlm^J

1

Parcel 3:
CO.^XNCINC at the Southwest corner of Block AA# Plat M C", ^^Y/CJ-Z/S'
Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence North 10 rods;
thence East 10 rods; thence South 10 rods; thence Vest
/ 10 rods to the point of beginning.

*

Parcel 6:
j / All of Lot 3, Block 1, JONES SUBDIVISION of Block 5A,
Plat M C", Salt lake City Survey.
e - 7 7 - ^

•\

l/

S

TOGETHER WITH the Eant half of vacated Clendale Street
adjoining on the Vest
Parcel
rarcei 7;
/;
*
All of Lots 1 and 23, Block 2, JONES SUBDIVISION of Block 5 A , ^ { C ^ / - Z 8 7
M
Plat "C , Salt Lake City Survey.
"
TOGETHER VITH the following described portion of vacated Clendale
Street adjoining en the East:

O

&

.'OTtwt Of DtrAVLT

3304045
NOTICF IS HEREBY GIVEN:

That RICHARD L. liLANCK is

Trustee under a Deed of Trust dated July 6, 1977, executed by
LeKal Corporation, a Utah corporation, Melvm E. Ingersoll end
Beverly Ingersoll, his wife, Leiand R. Ingersoll and Evelyn E.
Ingersoil, his wife, in which General Brewing Company, i
California corporation, is named as Beneficiary and Backman
Abstract b Title Company is named as Trustee, recorded July 18,
1977, as Entry No. 29713J0, in Book 4519, at Page 1159, of
Official Records in the Office of the County Recorder of Salt
Laxe County, Utah, describing land therein as:
SEE AITACKMFNT
Said obligations include a note in the principal hum of
$1,800,000.00.
A breach of, and default in, the obligations for which
such deed is security has occurred in that payments due en August
1, 1979 and September 1, 1979, in the total amount of $55,316.66,
have not beed paid.
By reason of such default, Richard L. Blanck, as
Trustee, and General Brewing Company, as Beneficiary, under said
Deed of Trust, do hereby declare all sums secured thereby i-nrediately due £*nd payable and have elected and do hereby elect to
cause the trust property to be sold to satisfy the obligations
secured thereby.
DATED this 7th day of September.
KICHARU L. BLANCK, Trustee
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
)
)

ss.

On t h i s 7 t h day of September, p e r s o n a l l y appeared betore
me Richard L. Blanck, as Trustee in the foregoing N o t i c e o t
Defau.l/t,/ who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

J

. *i
••*
:« ;
\ \&{jft\J$*
\ ^ \
•^
''M^£^*aVion ^Expires:

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah
•<
f

EXHIBIT

M

VIIf

Agreement recorded September 9, 1925, Entry Ho. S42S13 in Book 3-V,
J^me 573 „ said Western Pacific Kail TO ad Company granted an •atcoent and
rjght~of-vsy over a portion of above described tract to Oregon Short
j.ine JUilroad Company.
An Agreement recorded September 9, 1925 as Entry Wo. 54283*. in Book 3-V,
psge 338, by and between Oregon Short Line Railroad Co. and The Western
Pacific Kailroad Co. first parties, and Fisher Terminal Warehouse Co., n
corporation, second party, vhich provides for relocation vf present
trackage and construction of additional trackage in accordance with a
plat Barked Schedule "A H attached thereto*
A perpetual casesent for the sole and exclusive use of Oregon Short Line
JUilroad Coop any and the Western Pacific Kailroad Coapany for a Right of
Way for their present spur tracks over the following described land, to vit:
An irregular traet of land, being a part of Lot 6, Block 43,
?lat "C", Salt Lake City Survey, and those certain portions
of vacated First South Street (together vith other property
not covered by this deed) more particularly described in
instrument rwarded January 20, 1926 as Tntry Wo. 551852 in
Book 3 X of Liens and Leases, page 252.
A Right of Way for the purpose of laying, maintaining, operating and reaoval
of a gas pipe line along the following described line:
BIG1NKXHC at the Vest line of 10th West Street, and running
Vest on First South Street, 15 feet Sovth of the center line
thereof, to the Jordan Xiver; as created is favor of Utah Cat
a Coke Company by Instrument recorded July 27, 1949, as Entry
Wo. 61718$ in Book 44, TMJ • 589 of Official Records.
A Pol* Line Easeaent over the following described center line:
BEC1NN1NC at a point South B9*58'22" Vest 470 feet
froa a Monuaent at the intersection of First South
and Clendale Streets, and running thence South 0*12,22f'
Vest 51 feet; thence Korth 89*5B'22H East 43*.8 feet;
as created in favor of I'tah Power and Light Cospany, a
corporation, by instrument recorded August 23, 1945, as
Entry Wo. 10090B7 in Book 434,-1'agc 609 of Official
Records.

A Right of Vay for a 3 inch water pipeline along the following described
line:
BICXNN1HC at a point South 1236 feet and East 1136 feet
froa the Worthwest corner of Section 2, Township 1 South,
Range 1 Vest, Salt Lake laae and Meridian, and running
thence South 83*10* East 155 feet; thence South 25*30'
East 85 feet, as disclosed by Certificate of Appropriation
of Vater, recorded May 25, 1950, as Entry *©. 1201402 in
Book 768, Fage 266 of Official Records.
A perpetual caseDcnt for a drainage ditch along the Worth side of Vest
First South Street, together vith the right of tke City to enlarge said
ditch, as reserved by Salt Lake City in instrument recorded September 22,
1925, as Entry Wo. 543644 in Book 12-B, psge 524 of Olflclsl Records.
A ?ols Line Easement granted to Utah Fover 4 Light Coapany as recorded
January 16, 1961, in Book 1773, Fage 242, Entry Wo. 1756733, Official
Records, for the arectlon and continued maintenance, repair, slteratlcn,
and rcplaccaent of the alsctric transmission distribution and telephone
circuits of the Grantee and tvo anchon and thrss poles along a line
described as follows:
BECTKNIWG at a point vithin an existing transmission lins vhlch
is 900 fast South and 1139 feet East, mors or Isss, from
the Worthwest corner of Section 2, Township 1 South, Range
1 Vest, Sslt Lake Meridian, thence South 6*499 Vest 540 fsst
en paid land and being in Lots 3 and 6 of said Section 2.

^ pole Line Eaeeaent granted to Utah Power I tight Company as recorded
January 16, 196^, In Book 1773, Page 243, Intry Ko. 1756734, Official
Jlecords, for the arectloo and continued maintenance, repair, alteration,
and replacement of the alectrlc transmission distribution and telephone
circuits of tha Grantee and ona guy and 3 poles along a line described as
follows:
irxiKHXHC at a fence cm the north boundary line of the Cr ant ore*
land at a point 845 feet South and 117C fast Cast, aore or lets.
Iron the Northwest corner of Section 2, Tovnship 1 South, Kange
1 Vest, Salt LaVa Meridian, thence South 0*02* Cast 740 feet.
more or less, to a fence on the South boundary line of aald land
and being In Lots 3 and 6 of aald Section 2*
Any other rlghta of vay and easeaeats for roads, ditches, canals, utilities,
pipe lines, a t e , vhlch may exist over, under or across said land.

mi

r>

$S?

»1»CEL BO. ^^
All of Block 43, Pitt •C" # Silt Like City Survey

PABCEL 10, 2s
Beginning i t the Northeast corner of Lot 8, Block 43. Plat
•C", S i l t Lake City Survey and running thence East 4 f e e t ;
thenct South 660 f e e t ; thence Vest 4 feet to the Southeast
corner of Lot 1 of said Block 43; thence North 660 f e e t
to the point of beginning.
PiPCEL 1 0 , V*

Beginning at the Southwest corner of said Block 43, and
running thence Vest 99 feet; thence North 247.5 f e e t ; thence
Vest 163 f e e t , more or l e s s , to the East bank of the Jordan
Biver; thence Northerly along said East bank t o a p o i n t
due Vest from the Northwest corner of said Block 43; thence
East to the Northwest corner of said Block 43; thence South
660 feet to the point of beginning.
PABCEL 1 0 , *;

All of the South half of vacated First South Street lying
between the Vest line of Glendale Street produced and the
East Bank of the Jordan Fiver.
PARCEL 1 0 , 5 ;

Commencing at the Southwest corner of Block 44, Plat "C",
Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence North 10 rods;
t h e n c e East 10 r o d s : thence South 10 rods; thence Vest
10 rods to the point of beginning.
PABCEL 1 0 . 6;

a l l of Lot 3, Block 1, JONES SUBDIVISION of Block 54, Plat
•C", Salt Lake City Survey.
Together with the east half of vacated Glendale S t r e e t
adjoining on the Vest.

3

i.niFN RECORDED HAIL TO:
interstate Land Corporation
,9710 South 5200 West
West Jordan, Utah 84U84

Co
-

j0 ) i " ^ ^

~oo©

SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED

GENERAL BREWING COMPANY, a corporation " v g n r i z e d and
e x i s t i n g u n d e r the L w s of the State of California, with its principal
office at 79 S t . Thomas Way, T i b u r o n , California, herebv c o n v e y s and
warrant* against
all claims b y ,
t h r o u g h or under
GRANTOR
to
INTERSTATE LAND CORPORATION. GRANTF.F. for the sum of Ten and
n o / 1 0 0 Dollars ( $ 1 0 . 0 0 ) and o t h e r good and valuable c o n s i d e r a t i o n the
tract of b n d in Salt Lake C o u n t y , " t a n . described on Erhibit "A" which
is at ached h e r e t o .
THE OFFICER whu s i u n s this deed herehv certifies that t h . s
d e e d and the t r a n s f e r r e p r e s e n t e d t h e r e b y *'ts duly authorizeu u n d e r a
resolution duly adopted bv the Board of Directors of the GRANTOR at a
lawful meeting duly h«?ld and a t t e n d e d by a quorun..
IN WITN-SS WHEREOF, the GRANTOR has caused its corporate
name and s t a l to be h e r e u n t o affixed by it« duly authori-.ed officer t h i s
fTL d*y of IUJUU^
W4.

GENERAL BRFVMNG CJ»1PANY

8.

3

1^1
HI

PRESIDENT

STATE OF WASHINGTON )
: ss.
C O U N T Y O P CLAPK
)

t
°^

On the 7th day of February
19F4. personally a p p e a r e d
before me CARL E. MULLEN, J R . , b e i n g by me duly s w o r n , did «ay that
h e . the said CARL E. MULLEN. J R . . is the President of the General
Brewing Company
and that the within and foregoing instrument was
s i g n e d on behalf of said corporation by authority of a resolution of its
Board of D i r e c t o r s and said CARL E. MULLEN, J R . , duly a c k n o w l e d g e d
to me that said corporation e x e c u t e d the same and that the seal affixed
is the seal of said c o r p o r a t i o n .

«*
*Z
C*
CJ

WTA^\
Km

gffifa<Mn

>\$foV*tr£Vt»t«!

OT»,
WashingtoVi,
resfdmg at Vancouver
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EXHIBIT "VIII"

finest, to, 11
All of Bloc* *3, flit

#

C» t Silt Likt City Survty

fllCtl fQ. 21

B t | l n n l n | i t tht Worth*->t eorntr of Lot 8, Block *3. f l i t
•C% S i l t Likt City Surr»y tnd running thtnet f i s t * f t t t ; '
t h t n e t South 660 f t t t ; thtnet Vut I f t t t to the Southtist
eorntr of Lot 1 of e i l d Block * 3 ; t h t n e t Krrth 660 f t t t
t o tht point of b t i l n n l n i .
fktCIL 10. * i
B t | l n n l n | i t tht Southwest eorntr of s l i d Bloek * 3 , md
runoini thtnet Vtit 99 f t t t ; thtnet Korth 2*7.5 f t t t ; thtnet
Vtst 163 ff• 1 1 t o r t ir l t i s f to tht Cut bank of tht JorCin
BiTtr; t h t b e t northerly a l o n i Slid t t s t bink m 1 p o i n t
due Vtst froe tht Horthwtst eorntr of n l d Block *>!; thtr.se
t u t to tht Horthvtst eorntr of sild Bloek 13; thtr.ee South
660 f t t t to tht point of b t | l n n l n | .
pilCtL *Q. It
A l l of t h t South h i l f of v i e i t t d F i r s t South S t r t t t l y i n i
bttvttn tht Vtst l i n t of C I t n d i l t S t r t t t pr.duetd end tht
t u t tink of tht Jordan ftlvtr.

UlPZLJUUll
Coietne.'nc *t t h t Southvtst eorntr of Bloek e i , f l i t 'C*,
S i l t Likt City Survey, and running t h t n e t Korth 10 rods;
- h t n r t C i s t 10 r o d s : t h t n e t South 10 rods; t h t n e t Vtst
10 rU% to tht point of beginning.

nni is, t;
• 119 of Lot 3 , Block 1 f JOMtS SUBDIVISION of Block 5«,
•Z 9 S i l t Likt City Surrey.
T o | t t : « e r v i t h t h t t e s t h i l f of u c . u d

CItndilt

Strtt:

i d J c i o U l oe the Veet.

EXHIBIT "A"
•*•

flit

m c g L fg> **
.U- of Lett
$1, f U t 9C\

1 tod 2 3 . Bloek 2 , JC*t3 SUBtIv:*;oM of Block
Salt U k e City Surety.

3 | e t h s r with the f o l l o w i n g described portion of vacated
i t n d a l t S t - t t t t d j o l n l n f on thf E a s t ; C c i c t n c l n c 8 ? . ' .
f i t t JCorth fro« the S o u t h e a s t corner of l o t 1, Block 2,
•aid J0NF5 SUBDIVISION, and running thtnee M r t h 66 f t t t
t o t b t K c r t h f t t f t o o r n t r of aaid l o t 23- # l k enee f a i t 33
feeO* thence South 3 3 , * 2 * Vast 5 9 . * 8 f a i t ;o tha p o i n t
of aoms»noaa< At.
T o g t t h a f ^itn the Worth ona«h*Xf of vacated F i r s t
Strtat • i j c ' n i i i oo tha South.

South

FAS'tL >70. 3t
The following described portion of vacated First South
Street being the South one-half of vacated First South
Stteet lying between the West line of 1100 West Street
and the wtst line of Clendale Street produced across First
$:>jth Street. Beginning at a point 66.045 ftet South of
the Northwest Cor.ier of 1100 West and 100 South, which
ecrntr ia also tne Southeast Corner of Lot 1, Block 54,
Plat *C", 5»lt eke City Survey, and running thence
South 66.04$ fet ; .hence w*st 330.0 feet; ther.ce North
66.C45 feet; thence East 330.0 feet to the point of
beginning.
PM.CEL NO. f i
Tha following Aescrir^J portion of vacated Clendale Street:
Beginning at the Southea:-'. corner of Lot 1, Block 2. Jones
Subdivieio.i of Block St, *>lat "C*. Salt U k e City Survey
•nd running thence NortJ. 12.5 feet; tnenca North 33* 42*
Eaet 59.48 ftetf thence South 132.0 f«et thence West 33
feet to the point of becinning.
Together with the North on«»-helf of vacated Firet South
Street adjoining on the South,

SUBJECT TO TBI FOLLOWING MGHVS OF WAY AN3 EAStKINTi AND XNTERISTS:

X.

"lot.

br i«.J/"* ° f ° t , h , s " r

•3-

4 U

« h t Cotp.ny, .
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ADDENDUM
B.

Rule 5:

Statute and Rules Text

Local Rules of the Third Judicial District Court

Rule 56(c):
Rule 59;
Rule 60 (b)

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

Rule 5

RULES OF PRACTICE—3RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

(d) All motions for summary judgment or other dispositive motions must be
heard at least thirty (30) days before the date set for trial. No such motion
shall be heard after that date without leave of court.

Rule 5. Written orders, judgments and decrees.
Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice in the District Courts and of the State of
Utah shall not apply in the Third Judicial District Court.
(a) Filing of proposed orders, judgments or decrees. In all rulings
by a court, counsel for the party or parties obtaining the ruling shall
within fifteen (15) days or such shorter time as the court may direct, file
with the court a proposed order, judgment or decree in conformity with
the ruling.
(b) Service of proposed orders, judgments or decrees; objections.
Copies of the proposed order, judgment or decree in civil and domestic
cases shall be served on opposing counsel before being present
to the
court for signature unless approved as to form by opposing counsel, or the
court otherwise orders. Notice of objections thereto shall be filed with the
court and served on opposing counsel no later than five (5) days after
service of said proposed order, judgment or decree.
(c) Stipulated settlements; dismissals. Stipulated settlements and
dismissals shall be reduced to writing and presented to the court for
signature within fifteen (15) days of the settlement and dismissal.
(d) Default judgments. Default judgments which require a judge's
signature shall be submitted to the judge assigned to the case. Default
judgments which include an award of attorney's fees shall be supported
by an attorney's fee affidavit which sets forth: (1) the legal basis for the
award of the attorney's fees requested; (2) the amount requested; and (3)
evidence that the amount requested constitutes a fair and reasonable fee
for the services performed.

Rule 6. Pretrial calendar.
This rule modifies Rule 5.1 of the Rules of Practice of the District Courts
and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah.
Pretrial hearings in civil cases will be held when so ordered by the court.
Pretrial hearings will be held before the judge who has been assigned the
case. Motions for pretrial hearings may be filed at any time. Such motions
shall set forth with particularity why a pretrial hearing is requested. The
court may order in any case that such motions must be accompanied by a
proposed pre-trial order in the format set out in the Rules of Practice of the
District and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah; or that such a pretrial order
be prepared before a final settlement conference or trial date is set.

Rule 7. Motions for supplemental proceedings.
Motions for supplemental proceedings will be set on the regular weekly
supplemental proceedings calendar before a clerk of the court. Counsel may
alternatively schedule the matter to be heard before the judge assigned to the
case on the assigned judge's regular law and motion calendar.
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Rule 56

Failure of party or his attorney to appear at
pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303.
Default judgments against the United States
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190.
Key Numbers. — Judgment «=> 92

Opening default or default judgment claimed
to have been obtained because of attorney's
mistake as to time or place of appear: ^r^,
trial, or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L.K.3d
1255.
Failure to give notice of application for default judgment where notice is required only
by custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383.

Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
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(e) Filing transcript of satisfaction in other counties. When any satisfaction of a judgment shall have been entered on the judgment docket of the
county where such judgment was first docketed, a certified transcript of satisfaction, or a certificate by the clerk showing such satisfaction, may be filed
with the clerk of the district court in any other county where the judgment
may have been docketed. Thereupon a similar entry in the judgment docket
shall be made by the clerk of such court; and such entry shall have the same
effect as in the county where the same was originally entered.
Compiler's Notes. — There is no federal
rule covering this subject matter.

Cross-References. — Fee not charged for
filing satisfaction, § 21-2-2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Court.
—Duty.
—- —Attachment.
Effect.
—Acceptance of full payment.
Owner or attorney.
—Vacation of satisfaction.
——Hearing.
bv the judgment. Sierra Nevada Mill Co. v.
Keith O'Brien Co., 48 U. 12, 156 P. 943.

Court
—Duty.

Owner or attorney.

Attachment.
Court had duty to make order directing partial satisfaction of judgment to extent of money
collected through attachment proceeding.
Blake v. Farrell, 31 U. 110, 86 P. 805.

—Vacation of satisfaction.
Hearing.
The recorded satisfaction of judgment signed
by judgment creditor cannot be vacated without action and hearing in equity, and the lien
of an attorney against the proceeds of the judgment does not include his personal right to execute against the judgment debtor. Utah C. V.
Federal Credit Union v. Jenkins, 52* P.2d
1187.

Effect.
—Acceptance of full payment
When plaintiff voluntarily accepted full payment of a judgment in his favor, the satisfaction and discharge operated to satisfy and discharge everything merged in and adjudicated

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments
§ 979 et seq.
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 574 to 584.
A.L.R. — Voluntary payment into court of

judgment against one joint tort-feasor as release of others, 40 A.L.R.3d 1181.
Key Numbers. — Judgment «=> 891 to 899.

Rule 59- New trials; amendments of judgment.
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new7 trial in an
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions ol
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new
judgment:
180
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Rule 59

(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party,
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented from having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given
under the influence of passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision,
or that it is against law.
(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall
specify the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 59, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion
for new trial, § 21-2-2.
Harmless error not ground for new trial,
Rule 61.

Juror's competency as witness as to validity
of verdict or indictment, Rules of Evidence,
R u ] e go6.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Abandonment of motion.
Accident or surprise.
Arbitration awards.
Caption on motion for new trial.
Correction of insufficient or informal verdict.
Correction of record.
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Dev. Corp. v. Sather, 605 P.2d 1240 (Utah
1980).
Cited in National Farmers Union Property
& Cas. Co. v. Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7, 286 P.2d
249 (1955\\ Holmes v. Nelson, 7 Utah 2d 439 >
32* P 2d 722 H958); Howard v. Howard, l l
Utah 2d 149, 356 P.2d 275 (1960); Nunley *•
S u n Katz Real Estate, Inc., 15 Utah 2d 12&
388 P.2d 798 (1964); Hanson v. General BldrSSupply Co., 15 Utah 2d 143, 389 P.2d 6*
(1964); James Mfg. Co. v. Wilson, 15 Utah 2<*
210, 390 P.2d 127 (1964); Porcupine Reservoir
Co. v. Lloyd W. Keller Corp., 15 Utah 2d 31&
392 P.2d 620 (1964); Watson v. Anderson, 29
Utah 2d 36, 504 P.2d 1003 (1973); Nichols «•

State, 554 P.2d 231 (Utah 1976); E d a T
Wagner, 572 P.2d 405 (Utah 1977); T h n e ^ '
Fin. Corp. v. Brimhall, 575 P.2d 701 ( ^
1978); Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 P 2d ?H
(Utah 1980); Miller Pontiac, Inc. v. OsborV
soil-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1931V
Kohier v. Garden City, 639 P.2d 162 (Utak
1981); Pozzolan Portland Cement Co. v. GariL
ner, 668 P.2d 569 (Utah 1983); Nelson^
Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983); GohW
Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas. 699 P.2d 730 (Utafe
1985); Estate of Kay, 705 P.2d 1165 (Utafc
1985 . York v. Unqualified Washington
Countv Elected Officials, 714 P.2d 679 (UfcA
1986).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d New Tri^
§§ 11 to 14, 29 et seq., 187 iu 191.
C.J.S. — 66 C.J.S. New Trial §§ 13 et seq->
115, 116, 122 to 127.
A.L.R. — Consent as ground of vacating
judgment, or granting new trial, in civil case*
after expiration of term or time prescribed by
statute or rules of court, 3 A.L.R.3d 1191.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of suggestion
or comments by judge as to compromise or settlement of. civil case, 6 A.L.R.3d 1457.
in opposition to motion for new trial in civil
case, 7 A.L.R.3d 1000.
Quotient verdicts, 8 A.L.R.3d 335.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of instructions in civil case as affected by the manner *n
which they are written, 10 A.L.R.3d 501.
Prejudicial effect of unauthorized view fry
jury in civil case of scene of accident or premises in question, 11 A.L.R.3d 918.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of reference
by counsel in civil case to result of former trial

of same case, or amount of verdict therein, 15
A.L.R.3d 1101.
Absence of judge from courtoom during trial
of ci\il case, 25 A.L.R.3d 637.
Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in
case, or with partner or associate of 6uch attorney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64
A.L.R.3d 126.
Amendment, after expiration of time for filing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion
made in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845.
Authority of state court to order jury trial in
civil case where jury has* been waived or not
demanded by parties, 9 A.L.R.4th 1041.
Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching
verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on
appeal. 38 A.L.R.4th 1170.
Jury trial waiver as binding on later state
civil trial. 48 A.L.R.4th 747.
Key Numbers. — New Trial *=> 13 et seq.,
110, 116.

Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; ixa\id, etc. On motion and ixpwfc sraV* \srrn* as. at*yatft, Vne coxcrt, may
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (l)mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
188
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Rule 60

ne w

trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinor extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendanthas
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these
rules or by an independent action.
SiC

Compiler's Notes. — This rule is patterned
after, and similar to, Rule 60, F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion
to set aside judgment, § 21-2-2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Clerical mistakes.
—Computation of damages.
—Correction after appeal.
—Date of judgment.
Void judgment.
—Estate record.
—Inherent power of courts.
—Intent of court and parties.
—Judicial error distinguished.
—Order prepared by counsel.
—Predating of new trial motion.
Other reasons.
—"Any other reason justifying relief."
Default judgment.
Imposibility of compliance with order.
—r-Incompetent counsel.
Lack of due process.
Merits of case.
Mistake or inadvertencce.
Real party in interest.
Requirements.
—Effect of set-aside judgment.
Admissions.
—Fraud.
Divorce action.
—Independent action.
Constitutionality of taxes.
Divorce decree.
Fraud or duress.
Motion distinguished.
—Invalid summons.
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